VIRTUES/EXCELLENCES Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics [NE] and the Republic, provides an account of the science of the highest good. The good actually pertains to the character/value of an end. He tries to arrange the ‘goods’ according to a certain form of hierarchy. The highest good is the good or end “we pursue because of itself” and the “end because of which we choose other things”. It is presupposed that “we do not choose everything because of something else.” Our pursuit of something of greater in importance actually makes us spend certain good which we see as less important than the thing we pursue. Ultimately, we can acquire certain good which we cannot spend in pursuit of some more other goods. For Aristotle this is how human desire and ‘interests’ are primarily pursued. The goods are not all equal in importance/significance. The different distinctions employed by Aristotle are but very important in understanding a more holistic conception of virtues/excellences:
1. Firstly, the NE identifies various virtues/and excellences that cut across moral (virtues of character) and non-moral considerations (virtues of thought).
2. Secondly, distinction is made to refer to good/excellences as qualities of individuals and good/excellences as qualities of institutions (city) and the relationship between these two.
3. Thirdly, distinction is made between goods/excellences as something that brings physical pleasurable (in the material/economic sense) and good/excellences as pleasurable in the moral sense (or non- physical). , distinction
4. Aristotle also mentions certain excellences related to bounty in terms of external goods and excellences which may be attained despite non-bounty of such goods.
5. Another things, is virtue/excellences in terms of what is fair and what is just (which overlaps with discussions of good/excellence of an individual and the institution.
Individuals are weighed generally in terms of capacities/capabilities; rules/principles they can follow (that is, range of possible actions they can perform) through natural and learned ability; ends or goals they have in the short and long-run and how and how much they were able to attain them; and the desires and wants they pursue, including how much effort they are willing to forgo just to satiate these desires and wants. One’s desires and wants may sometimes conflict with the end and goal he works for. Institutions may also be rated in terms of virtues and excellences they portray. These would normally appear in terms of the different dimensions. Medical and educational institutions, for example, can be evaluated in terms of more particular measures of efficiency and effectiveness in relation to institutional goals, and additionally, in terms of the way they cope with the problems facing them. Institutions can also be distinguished by what kinds of competencies and habits they teach to individuals. Individual learning and unlearning take place within the context of larger institutions. The notion of the so-called social capital takes into consideration the significance of good working habits and virtues that contributes to social, political and economic development. Habit of thriftiness, hard work, honesty, among others, belongs to such virtues/values. We have imbibed so many habits as part of our culture, ethnicity and civilization and we may not even be aware of all our habits that we have acquired from various sources. Some of our habits, we may not even be conscious of. Government and Religious institutions are very powerful in shaping habits that have large consequences. Moreover, institution is also graded in terms of what rules and principles it espouses. The case can be that rules are as such so that we have this kind of institutional structure. Or that no rules are yet present so that this or that particular problem can be taken care of, e.g. rules to comply with efficiency. Aristotle tries to place a common denominator for the various sorts of excellences and virtues. The goodness of means and ends ultimately rests in its relation of human actions. Moral and non-moral excellences/virtues are exemplified in terms of its relation to human action and consciousness. “For we took the goal of political science to be the best good; and most of its attention is devoted to the character of the citizens, to make them good people who do fine actions” (Irwin, 23). Human actions, convictions and pursuit of interest ultimately fashion excellences and excellences of various sorts are either exemplar or example in that particular context. Incidence of fine actions could be complex in view of the various instrumental and intrinsic goods. Away from human actions and consciousness, no entity of whatsoever, I think, can acquire value or contextual significance.
NOTION OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE INVISIBLE HAND Pursuit of Self-Interest and Unintended Good Consequences in the Larger Context
I intend first to expose and make a few clarifications on some very important distinctions in Adam Smith’s account of the notion of self-interest. His proposition is quite simple, that is, individuals should be allowed to pursue their own self-interest; and, in the long run, that would generally result to ‘public good’. However, one needs to understand the significance of this pursuit of self-interest as part of the larger context that he wants to pursue, which falls under the critic of the mercantilist system. The mercantilists believed that economic prosperity could be realized by limiting imports and encouraging exports in order to maximize the amount of gold in the home country. Smith is saying, in a sense, that limiting imports and encouraging exports, the way the mercantilists practice, is not consistent with allowing pursuit of self-interest; it is not actually consistent with efficient production of wealth; and, pursuit of self-interest has inevitable manifestations in terms of enhancing the mechanism for the production of wealth.Another major point would be that of how ‘self-interest’ is related to concept of benevolence. If requiring benevolence is actually a way of not allowing the pursuit of self-interest it can only be prescribed to such extent that practice of benevolence can also be allowed. This statement, I think, is implied in his discussions in the second chapter of Wealth of Nations [WN], entitled Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labor. He notes that, “But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it for their benevolence only” (WN, p.14).
Now, I want to consider, point by point some other distinctions and implications so as to grasp a more comprehensive understanding of the range (and forms) of self-interests he is referring to.
Concerning Self-Interest and Non-benevolence
“Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want” (WN, p.14).
- A non-benevolent person is someone who is willing to give “part of those good offices which we (or other) stand in need of” only when others acquired it from him through a treaty, barter or purchase; assuming treaty, barter and purchase are relationships covered by certain form of rules [minimal rules of justice] and do not depend on “whatever goes.” Non-benevolence or pursuit of self-interest, however, is not extended to include acquisition of goods by obviously unjust means like stealing and cheating, and those other means that go outside the boundary of what might be considered treaty, barter or purchase.
For that matter, I wish to distinguish between pursuit of self-interest or non-benevolence exemplified by want or desire to trade and barter and pursuit of self-interest as desire or want to acquire certain goods by cheating and stealing – and such other values or practices similar to these. I think Smith would approve of the idea that there is nothing wrong if everyone were to pursue their self interest based on the first definition; however, if everyone were to pursue self interest according to the second definition it would be impossible. I want to support this claim by pointing out that the form of self-interest he tries to define must be allowed for all and not merely for some. I cannot find any implication in his work that says that it would after all be good for the society (let’s say in terms of wealth) if some are allowed to commit cheating and stealing either permanently or not permanently. Smith would be much closer to saying that actions exemplifying cheating and stealing would be unhealthy in terms of encouraging ‘free competition’.
Concerning Benevolence
- Benevolence may be exemplified by willingness to give “part of those good offices which we (or other) stand in need of “ even when we (or others) can or cannot afford [or do or do not have the means] to acquire such goods by means of treaty, barter or purchase – including those other means that belongs within this range of relationships. It may still remain an issue whether willingness to appropriate ones goods to others in this manner, even if others actually have the capability to acquire them by barter, trade or purchase, still belongs to act of benevolence. But I don’t want to pursue that distinction here as much as Smith did not pursue it.
- Individuals can only be benevolent to a certain extent because, for one reason, the occasions that allows for them to be influenced are very limited.
Persons may be motivated or influenced to act in accordance with benevolence to others but several human circumstances offers limitation for such occasion.
“In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons” (WN, p. 14).
- Relying merely on benevolence of others is not appropriate, for the utilities it occasion for fall short of what one actually wants to occasion as a matter of personal want.
“Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessities of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them” (WN, p.14)
- Reliance on benevolence of others may extend to a point where individuals are not encouraged to “apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may posses for that particular species of business” (WN, p. 15)
[This idea is very significant in terms of what Aristotle says about eudemonia and arête. He says of happiness as attainment of one’s eudemonia which is to be in activity that exemplifies certain virtues. The perfection or development of individual talent or genius for a particular species of business and the development of (perhaps intellectual) virtue in the sense Aristotle mentioned are not far from being similar.]
- Adam Smith’s, however, is open to the possibility of anyone choosing to be benevolent more than anyone else. Reliance on benevolence of others and choosing to be benevolent towards others are two different things. Benevolence may not be required and it may be in vain to rely on benevolence of others but these do not preclude someone from choosing to be benevolent. Consequently, certain individuals could be so much benevolent to others but only a few, or none at all, may actually choose to rely on his or her benevolence (I am citing this as a possibility). Hypothetically, if there is such a thing as minimum benevolence required for public good, we can always believe that actual practice of benevolence has not yet surpassed that minimum or that it could hardly be surpassed; more so in the case of maximum, is there is such.
Benevolence is just naturally unreliable as a means to acquire some goods because “he will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them”. This unreliability neither precludes the possibility of acting benevolently nor through which Smith implies something of the sort that it is imperative to prohibit, constrain or limit the actual extent or prevalence of benevolence. It is just clear that Smith did not place any indication that benevolence should be prohibited or constraint to a certain point, as much as it should be required.
Appropriate policies that conduce to the accumulation of wealth take into consideration the allowance of pursuit of self-interest. I think the preceding considerations are far enough to be able to proceed to some other discussions relating pursuit of self-interest, ‘invisible hand process’, accumulation of wealth and public good.
Pursuit of Self-Interest under Minimal Rules of Justice, Accumulation of Wealth and Public Good
The extent of pursuit of individual self-interest will ‘naturally’ reach a level of sophistication and unintendedly will result to a more complex system of barter, exchange and purchase called the market. The market, as such, is distinguishable in terms of several features. These features exemplify, so to speak, the excellences of market as an institution that leads to ‘public good’. Market is a very powerful mechanism. Responding to it is a good complex within which individuals can develop and learn good habits and extirpate certain ‘vices’. It could be the bases of what skills individual may want to develop. The division of labor, which Smith defined as occasioned by pursuit of self-interest, somehow justifies this. Since practically it is relatively unstable for individuals to choose to rely on benevolence of others (who, let’s just say, always have the options to be benevolent or to pursue their self-interest), they would acquire the belief that it would be much reliable if they can acquire the goods they need or want through treaty, barter or purchase. This learning process among individuals intensifies and becomes a habit (in terms of consciousness and actions) in the long run. As a consequence, it would be much more practical for an individual to develop certain talents and capabilities (for the attainment of certain objects) through which he/she most efficiently or effectively can acquire goods he/she needs/wants by treaty, barter or purchase. The significance of attaining certain ends through division of labor is both evident at individual and institutional level. The capability of institution to produce goods which will serve as the most effective and efficient (in quality and quantity) instrument in treaty, barter and purchase will be served unequal through division of labor. Moreover, division of labor has certain features that may prove to be most effective in developing corresponding talents in individuals:
- “Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of things. But in consequence of the division of labor, the whole of every man’s attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object” (WN, p. 9).
- “As thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may posses for that species of business” (WN, p. 15).
Thus with division of labor, more and more treaty, barter or purchase shall ensue. While it is clear that Smith thinks that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, for the range (power) of exchanges, barter or purchases, determine how much labor is actually needed (considering labor is an input in the production process); however, it may arguably be said that the division of labor can actually extend the power of exchanging or the range of the market. Adam Smith is working on the assumption that the extent of the market (trade) primarily determines how much labor employment must actually be required or is available (from the point of view of individuals looking for employment). However, considerable works on the link between production and consumer behavior (function of wants) point to the consideration that, as a society becomes increasingly affluent, wants are increasingly created by the process by which they are satisfied. The propensity to barter, exchange, or purchase (the range of the market) may actually come to depend on (or passively motivated) by what and how much goods are produced through employment of labor and other production inputs (Mansfield 1985: 3-6). Under the market ‘order’ individuals are constantly subject to forces of supply and demand and competition constrained by some minimal rules of justice or fairness (in a more economic sense). Smith’s invisible hand process assumes an atomistic competition “which in turn assumes that the system is decentralized and that no competitor is large relatively to others” (qtd from The Corporation, Competition and the Invisible Hand by Robin Marris and Dennis Meuller of
Mansfield, 1985: 91). The concept of competition in Smith additionally exemplifies the interplay between forces of supply and demand significance of which may be expressed in the following terms:1. reduced supply led to higher price (when consumer demand dictates a race to get limited supplies)2. when the price is excessive, the price will sink more (producer demand dictates a race to be rid of excess supplies)3. the intensity of competition among consumers and among sellers dictates how much individuals will respond to forces of supply and demand. Smith proposes to show how competition intensifies (among those who are independently pursuing their self-interest): among consumers and among producers.
In the long-run, this form of competition will motivate production of more wealth than when it is actually hindered by some ‘public’ policy. Now ‘public’ policy and issues concerning pursuit of self-interest in relation to effective and efficient accumulation of wealth become closer to one another in this respect. The propensity to exchange, barter, or purchase (buy and sell, so to speak) are the basic elements in every market institutions. Supply and demand are measures of these propensities. The optimal level of supply and demand, and their relationship, is not inconsistent with self-centered pursuit of one’s interest. We say that the market order that exemplifies good features is one that which is not deliberately designed (or is the product of an invisible hand process).. Undesigned market ‘order’ takes the form of that which “is not the effect of any conscious regulation by the state or society,” taking from the words of Smith.
Institutional Excellences and Complementary Functions of State and Market ‘Order’ Social benefit and economic order are the result of the self-interested actions of individuals rather than consequences of some deliberate design or plan. This proposition further means that public benefit need not (and would not) form as part of the normal motivation of the main actors in the economic process. Individuals unconsciously promote an end ‘which was no part of his intention’. The following passages from the Wealth of Nations significantly speaks towards this direction: As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it. (WN IV.ii.9) For Smith, this view on the working of economic processes helps to explain the functions the state or government should perform, and the way in which these functions should be performed. The functions of the state, if minimal, are quite indispensable in the sense that it must provide such (unproductive) services as defense, justice and those public works which are unlikely to be provided by the market. Smith provided a list of ‘public services’, and provisions for them should include the following considerations: 1. Public services should be provided only when that market has failed to do so.2. Equity and efficiency, e.g. public services should always be paid for by those who use them.
Unless the state is confined to its proper functions (which construe to its excellences as an institution), it would actually be disadvantageous to the economy. The moment the state confined itself within its proper boundaries or within what ‘system of natural liberty’ dictates as its duties, individuals would have enough space to pursue their interests, in terms of barter, exchange, and purchase of goods. All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. (WN IV.ix.51) The excellences of institutions, like the market, in the form of certain conceived “order”, are created without deliberate design under these parallel circumstances. Arguments of the good life and good society are clearly understood in terms of the formation and development, not only of the market, but also of culture, human personality, and laws.
Systems we are into have a way of reinforcing certain things; and we, in pursuit of our own self-interests (sometimes in conflicting ways), shape (in a collective manner) unintendedly the form of excellences which are relevant to good life and good society. It is logically and psychologically impossible to make sense of all the factors and decisions of individuals within the complex of community and society. This maybe is the main reason why the methodological excursus employed by Smith and Marx have involved “simplifications” and “idealizations”. These are required because the physical and social conditions under which we are immersed may actually prove to be more pervasive than we can actually be conscious of. The mind (consciousness) to world, world to mind, and mind to mind complexes are involved and simply cannot be denied. Technically, you can only intend something up to a point where you can actually be conscious of. Pursuit of self-interest is tantamount to acting in accordance with doing my best to avoid all undesirable consequences (incompatible with what I intend to do) up to a maximum point where I can actually be conscious of. The understanding of the nature of social processes which Smith, Marx and Mill have tried to be conscious of so that they can propose certain ‘social’ intervention (but not in a sense of designing it deliberately) presupposes certain criteria of consciousness. The nature of social process was based on an attempt to include premises in the form of being the most plausible or practical. Bernard de Mandeville on ‘Private Vices, Public Benefits’ I want to offer a separate discussion on the proposition that pursuit of self interest among individuals lead to considerable consequences on the excellences of institutions or society. It may be noted, however, that Mandeville and Smith have pursued on more or less same direction in terms of conception of the good of society as the product of unintended design. In here, I merely want to point out several things which distinguish him from Smith and Marx. Mandeville was primarily working on the argument that ‘Public Vices’ leads to ‘Public Benefits’ One of the most considerable of his statements includes: man’s “vilest and most hateful qualities are the most necessary Accomplishments to fit him for the largest, and, according to the World, the happiest and most flourishing Societies. Establishment of gambling casinos, production of ‘vices’ such as liquor, and other things that pave way for ‘fleshly’ lust and satisfaction of its desires; and pursuit of practices such as womanizing, gambling, drinking may actually lead to public goods because of their tendency to contribute to maximization of economic activities by providing employment for the unemployed. Statements of the sorts are consistent with the preceding argument. The aggressive pursuit of wealth and ‘happiness’ by individuals thru possible and available means, Madeville argued, should not be hindered by reference to social discipline which is being required by rule of elites – called the “imaginary” rewards of praise. He refers further to vices as ‘inconveniences which no government upon earth can remedy’ and as the forms of faults and corruption in several professions and callings. In terms of which (corruptions), if mankind could be cured, they would cease to be capable of being raised into such vast, potent and polite societies. I think, in terms of these considerations what Mandeville is saying partially differs to that of Smith. Mandeville’s list of activities tantamount to pursuit of self-interest is pretty much less classified than Smith. This may be attributed to his strategy of criticizing the political situation in his time by infusing sarcastic suggestions. I think so because we can actually find statements in his works that resemble more like that of Smith: “In the same manner, if laying aside all worldly Greatness and Vain-Glory, I should be asked where I thought it was most probable that men might enjoy true happiness, I would prefer a small peaceable society, I which men, neither envied nor esteemed by neighbors, should be contented to live upon the natural product of the spot they inhabit, to a vast multitude abounding in wealth and power, that should always be conquering others by their arms abroad, and debauching themselves by foreign luxury at home.”
The extent of pursuit of self-interest Mandeville proposes extends further, I think, to that what Smith tries to propose. I think, in a certain sense this could also be a practical strategy since he is talking about ‘vices’ in terms of incurable corruption. To consider them as part of the determination of the nature of social process is simply being practical.
EXCELLENCES AND INSTITUTIONS The Nicomachean Ethics generally refers to virtues of soul as virtues of character and virtues of thought which correspond to respective sets of criteria and standards. Means and ends relations are involved in the determination of criteria and standards for virtues of character or moral qualities/excellences, on one hand; and in the determination of criteria and standards for virtues of thought or non-moral qualities/excellences, on the other. However, the features of the form of deliberation for moral virtues may somehow necessarily differ to that of non-moral virtues. The moral and non-moral qualities or values that count as excellences of institutions and individuals may be understood under different contexts. We have identified in class the different context under which excellences/virtues can be understood. Excellences or virtues could be task relative, rule relative, principle relative, role relative, universal invariant or transcendent or ‘super-virtue’. Characterization of being moral and non-moral may actually cut across these contextual distinctions. Rules, for example, are very effective in specifying moral qualities that a good employee must embody. Rules could be those that prohibit, merely allow or require that something be done. Rules could also be non-moral qualities such as the quality of a good theorem in mathematics that efficiently and effectively can guide individuals in proving certain mathematical problems. In like manner, Adam Smith and Mandeville have touched on the general manner by which certain standards of excellence can be employed as measure of objects in a sense moral and in another sense, non-moral. Smith offers in the Theory of Moral Sentiments the different ways by which appreciation of values are generally done:“In case of this kind, when we are determining the degree of blame or applause which seems due to any action, we very frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the idea of complete propriety and perfection, which in those difficult situations, no human conduct ever did, or ever can come up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men must forever appear blamable and imperfect. The second is the idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far so ever it may be removed from absolute perfection, seems to deserve applause; and whatever falls short of it, to deserve blame.”
The distinction was made between judgment based on certain idea of perfection and judgment based on comparative values of actual objects based on certain parameters where their differences lie.
Excellences and their relations to choice and deliberation and conception/idea of luck. To make sense more of the nature of excellences and their nature based on idea of deliberation and choice, allow me to import certain ideas of luck. Brute luck and option luck distinctions goes something like this: some circumstances (brute luck) that holds for my life may be present in such a way the I don’t will nor I could be responsible for them because they represent possibilities independent of my efforts, choices and likes; however, it could also be the case that what I choose to do have a way of determining the kind of circumstances (luck) that will befall me. I think human actions are done, generally and the very least, within the context of unconconscious possibilities and perceived possibilities (those we try hard to be conscious of). Thought experiments are grand attempts to be conscious of, and lessen our unconsciousness (or ignorance) of, the nature of social processes (economic, political, and moral order) from which certain possibilities may be viewed to ensue based on the consideration of certain counterfactual premises that Smith and Karl Marx tried to bestow with practicality. They have envisioned that certain consequences could be suitable under circumstances conceptualized by “simplifications” and “idealizations”. They are not far from implying that valid forms of “simplifications” and “idealizations” are those that attain certain standards of “practical inquiry.” In the RET, Malthus was quoted, referring to “practical inquiry” as exhibited by Smith’s work: “One of the specific objects of the present work is to fit the general rules of political economy for practice, by endeavoring to consider all the causes which concur in the production of particular phenomena” (RET p.9). Their respective account of the conception of the nature of social processes (for Marx, political economy is generally characterized by cyclical, crises prone processes; while for Smith, by an orderly, harmonious process) are springboards for critical reflection on what needs to be done, how should conception of excellences conducive to “good life” and justice be fashioned, and what needs to be taken in order to realize them. The bridge between ‘what is’ (that is, the account of the nature of objects under consideration) and ‘what is ought’ (what needs to be done), I think is greatly a matter of deliberation and choice. David Hume’s view that ‘ought’ cannot be deduced from ‘what is’ draws consideration on the significant of the process of deliberation and choice. The constant value of ‘what is’ may not prompt exactly the same values in terms of ‘what is ought’ when presented to different sets of deliberating individual or sets of individuals who are allowed to pursue their self-interest under certain ‘minimal rules of justice’. We have mentioned in class that the nature of market institutions (order) is such that individuals respond to it as a very powerful mechanism which cannot be disregarded. But it could be that despite the forces inherent in every market institution, say supply and demand, that individual/group still decide to be influenced by something else like that of rational within them (or let’s say by arbitrary motivation/desire). When individual/group of individuals are allowed to pursue their self-interest they will ‘naturally’ be provided with ‘optimal’ amount of space by which they can fashion their deliberation and decision in terms of ‘what is ought’ in consideration of ‘what is’. To a large extent, especially when looking to along stretch of history of human decisions, we can say that social forces work within the context of uncoordination-we cannot exactly know which forms of motivations individuals have actually chosen to take effect certain actions. Certain similar actions may fall under different descriptions and motivations. Even consequences may render to be the same under disparate motivations. Additionally, decisions are done by individuals even without considering that it is part of certain larger social end; but were pursued merely as part of individual decision to satiate individual want. These considerations highlights/justify an attempt to show how the social condition can reveal itself as a product of unintended consequences of human actions within a complex of various institutional relations who pursue their self-interests (including their conception of ‘excellences’). Consideration of circumstances such as these facing an individual -which may be out of his/her control-, can be counted under brute luck. However, the prevalence of unintended consequences does not preclude us from thinking and acting in accordance with choice and deliberation. Conceptions of excellences/virtues (especially of character) in Aritotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are considered under possibilities of appropriate form of deliberation and choice. Aristotle, I think, is working in line with the idea that individuals should not be allowed to preclude, that because of their inescapable luck (or misfortune), they can do nothing about their attitudes, character or morality, in the larger context.
How can we be shown to be responsible for our moral character, despite the fact that elements of luck may actually contribute to the circumstances under which we live in? I want to offer the following discussions to give light to the idea of how it may possibly be shown that individuals are, to some extent, responsible for their excellences. Additionally, this somehow exposes certain features of the relationship between moral and non-moral excellences in Aristotle’s philosophy by introducing notions of external goods, role of good fortune in shaping our lives, actions in terms of virtue, and responsibility for our actions and voluntariness. It is very much practical to think that good economic ‘fortune’ (or bounty of wealth) does not necessarily translate to ‘good’ character in the moral sense. However, it still seems that performance in accordance with ‘good’ moral character (or excellences) possibly needs certain amount of external good. But this could also be ultimately dependent on capabilities of individuals to pursue excellences – we just cannot tell, from available resources, whether there are individuals who can perform actions that exemplify moral excellences with material resources ‘below the minimum.’ Sometimes, the case it such that those deprive of material resources has nothing to be proud of but their ‘moral excellences’. Moral reasoning is generally more productive if it makes sense of the content of moral excellences by considering them as something individuals can actually adopt for themselves and something attainable within the context of individuals’ responsibility. In this manner, moral excellences and non-moral excellences could possibly be distinguished. Aristotle, referring to moral virtues, finds it as unsound or unreasonable to:1. Believe that virtue consists or is composed by some element of luck which can preclude our being responsibility for our actions or moral character2. Undermine our definition of moral character by inclusion of the element of luck which forms part as an exclusive (that which does not belong) member of it.3. Identify all moral excellences with good fortune as some people do.
Good birth, beauty and friends are among the sorts of prosperity (external goods) that seem to be needed, in addition, to attain ‘happiness’. What is more convincing, and that indeed deserves good attention, is the argument that deprivation of these external goods “mars our blessedness, for we do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solitary or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad, or were good but have died (Irwin, 21). Good as it may seem, this type of argument is not enough to provide us with reasons that will suffice to convince us that we should rely on some elements of luck or indeed elements of luck to form part in shaping our moral character. What is that being shaped, simply needs some clarification as well as what must we consider as things contributory to such shaping. Indeed Aristotle clearly tackled the Place of Virtue and External Goods in Happiness. Identifying conception of happiness (or excellences), with good fortune on one hand, and virtue of character on the other hand, are two separate or different things. Good fortune brings a totally different sort of happiness from the sort of happiness that, through his description, Aristotle said to be something acquired by virtue. Now, what he is saying is not simply a description (which forms part of how to reason properly with morality), but also a prescription to adopt. Happiness in the moral sense must be acquired by Virtue, by our own actions, not by fortune. Winning a lottery and acquiring lots of wealth is not simply tantamount to acquiring happiness in terms of moral excellence. This will therefore affect the manner by which we should regard our method of discourse on different (or plural) excellences. If it’s our moral character it must not be defined in terms of the elements of luck or fortune which may seem to have contributing factors towards its formation. There must be a proper regard for the role of fortune (especially when brought about by brute luck) in the life of an individual:1. “For a truly good and intelligent person, we suppose, will bear strokes of fortune suitably….” (Irwin, 26).2. Serious misfortunes may oppress and spoil someone’s blessedness but return to happiness is not sealed to impossibility. Rather, “it will take long and complete length of time that includes great and fine successes.” Overcoming strokes of misfortune will even give a truly good individual the opportunity to do things that may be attributed with great and fine successes, thereby more blessedness (in moral sense) and honor. Misfortunes can serve as instrument for the goodness/virtue in an individual through actions. In like manner great strokes of good fortune may cause us to lose moral excellence when we don’t know how to handle them properly. But it will increase our opportunity for more excellence and acts of virtue by handling them properly.
A fine account of what acts are voluntary and involuntary in nature is carried out by Aristotle to help us discern to which a certain activity belongs to, vice or virtue. The reason why definition of voluntary and involuntary actions are included in Aristotle’s account of ethics because it assists in showing what count as our acts of/in virtue or vice. Moral excellences/virtue must be acknowledged as product, or that which arise, out of some form of responsibility. Actions or feelings, the way their actualization, ends, purpose or effects are constituted may be denied by an individual to have originated from him or her (just like in a court litigation when an accuse denies accountability for his/her acts). Through a sound application of conception of voluntary and involuntary actions, the way Aristotle did, some form of clarification is actually sought regarding how we can attribute responsibility consequences arising out of individual actions and feelings. The best way to describe the relationship between an individual and his acts (and its consequences) can be said in terms of responsibility. “Your act”-means you deserve all the right to be associated with it. Of course, this statement is justifiably correct or good if we can provide for the implicit requirement that our definition of ownership of acts is not undermined. It is very important to show that we are indeed responsible for our acts although sometimes we try to deny them or treat the definition that provides for the basis of our being responsible for them as undermined. Steps have been taken by various philosophers, not only Aristotle, to put up comprehensive criteria that can be used to show how much responsibility a person owed to his acts. Our responsibility for our acts requires recognition that moral excellence/character is not defines through a single act of “ours.” Character or excellence refer to something that which is sustained in terms of actualization or implementation. A single act that happens to be I accordance with certain excellence can never tell our true moral excellence/character. Thus, the development of an excellence/moral character in us requires education or habituation with sound and concrete foundation. Our moral character must be defined in such a way that it is shown to be a product of our decision and choice of some means or ends by application of some notion of choiceworthiness. Ideas on the appropriate personal responsibility for our moral excellences can confirm the need for choice and deliberation. The idea can also provide us with the bases for intolerance of indefinite pursuit of self-interest. If we cannot, at least, show that individuals somehow can deliberate and choose, and that their actions are products of their choice and deliberation, we would not have the basic foundation for any account of excellences and human development. For excellence and human development must necessarily presuppose notion of human choice and deliberation as consistent with the process of determining ‘what is ought’ from ‘what is.’ The basic equivalent of choice and deliberation would be that of intending certain consequences as ends by selecting the appropriate means. At this point, it would be necessary to draw in certain elements necessary in the process of deliberation and choice of certain means most effective towards an end. Consequentialist arguments rely on the role of the distinction between possible, feasible and desirable in the process of choice and deliberation: 1. Conception of things that are possible or possible courses of actions which includes those means, for/with certain ends, within our ability/power to execute. At a given time, there are possible courses of action individuals can pursue because they have abilities. And, at a given time, individuals are pursuing courses of action which are only given by what is possible. This may include, among others, economic, social and political activities. Some of these possible means complement each others, but some opposes each other or another.
2. Conception of feasible, practical or the most sufficient courses of action, which includes those possible courses of action whose, according to certain properties, values are more sophisticated than others in terms of arriving at a particular end. From among the alternative actions possible among different sorts of activities, a particular form of procedure of saturation can be done to determine that there are really actions which belong to the most practical and most sufficient given the circumstances.
3. Conceptions of things desirable, which consequentially things which can and/or ought to attain sustained existence. Those actions pursued belonging to the most practical and most sufficient can attain a sustained existence and also provide sustained existence and are desirable or at least more desirable than other alternatives or is the least unfavorable (if all possible courses of actions are disadvantageous/outrageous/perverse).
These elements can be adopted and actually utilized in coordinating various sorts of deliberation, not only on moral excellences, but also on non-moral excellences and those covering different development contexts such as political, economics, technological, scientific, and etc. Our focuses on individual and institutional moral and non-moral excellences, our attempt to make sense of responsibility of individual action, and the contribution of individuals to unintended consequences allow us to discuss invisible hand process and deliberation side by side without inconsistency.
Reference List
Irwin, Terence. 1985. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics.
Indianapolis: Hackett. (Translation with glossary and extensive notes.)
Mansfield, Edwin. (ed.) 1985. Microeconomics: selected readings. (5th ed.)
New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1904. Ed. Edwin Cannan. Library of Economics and
Liberty. 27 March 2006. <http://www.econlib.org/LIBRARY/Smith/smWN19.html>.
De Mandeville, Bernard, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 2 vols. With a Commentary Critical, Historical, and Explanatory by F.B.Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).27 March 2006.<http://oll.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Mandeville_0014.01.pdf>
[Please note that I also have utilized the Wealth of Nation currently on reserve section of CSSP library. However, due to time constraint, I failed to get the complete my citation of it. In this work, those parenthetical references that appear in the form “WN, p. [page number]” represent my considerable effort to signify gratitude to that WN translation/edition.]
